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Abstract 
 
A sample of European Union countries are examined for evidence of tax 
smoothing over the period 1970-2005. Two testing procedures are applied to a 
single sample of countries to assess the consistency of evidence across testing 
methods. This study includes the application of a new data set to the tax 
smoothing question which provides an estimate of the temporary component of 
public expenditure. This study also argues that the application of the constraints 
imposed on fiscal policy in the Maastricht Treaty will affect the conduct of a tax 
smoothing policy. The effects of the Maastricht Treaty on tax smoothing 
behaviour are investigated. 
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Tax Smoothing in the Presence of the Maastricht 
Constraint 
I. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to elucidate upon the behaviour of fiscal authorities and 
to establish whether support can be found for Barro’s tax-smoothing hypothesis 
in a sample of European Union countries in the post 1970 period. The approach 
taken in this study is to apply two testing methodologies to a single multi country 
sample of EU countries to establish what support if any is provided for the tax 
smoothing hypothesis. This is an interesting period to test for evidence of the tax 
smoothing hypothesis as it is a period which encompasses the adoption of the 
Maastricht Criteria and the subsequent Stability and Growth Pact in many of the 
sample countries. These supra-national budgetary institutional changes provide a 
unique opportunity to establish whether this constraint affects the evidence in 
support of the tax smoothing hypothesis in a cross country sample.  
 
The tax smoothing hypothesis is developed upon the Ricardian view of the fiscal 
deficit as restated by Barro (1974). The Ricardian view contends that farsighted 
individuals plan their consumption expenditures not only over their own life 
cycles but that they are also linked to successive generations through 
altruistically motivated resource transfers. Individuals therefore face a 
consumption allocation decision out of dynastic resources (their own resources 
and those of successive generations). In such a framework budget deficits result 
in a transfer of the burden of taxation across time and leave dynastic resources 
unaffected. Therefore deficit policy does not matter. If these strict assumptions 
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are to hold then why do fiscal deficits occur? Barro (1979) answered this 
question by arguing that optimal fiscal policy dictates that taxes should be set 
such that the distortionary costs of taxation are minimised. As such fiscal deficits 
arise as a result of temporary fluctuations in public expenditure. This is known as 
the tax smoothing approach to fiscal policy. 
 
The approach to testing the tax smoothing hypothesis has evolved since it was 
first proposed and tested by Barro (1979, 1986 and 1987). Barro tested the tax-
smoothing hypothesis indirectly by examining if its implications for the fiscal 
deficit were supported by the data. The fiscal deficit was modelled as depending 
on temporary public expenditure because permanent public expenditure was 
funded by current taxation. Sahasakul (1986) and Gupta (1992) tested the tax-
smoothing hypothesis directly by modelling the tax rate1 as depending on 
permanent public expenditure. Recent literature tends to test the hypothesis based 
on the argument in Roubini and Sachs (1989) that a simpler direct test of the 
hypothesis is to examine if the tax rate is stationary, e.g. Strazicich (2002). This 
paper uses (i) the Barro approach because it tests if tax-smoothing determines the 
fiscal deficit; and, (ii) the Roubini and Sachs approach because it is currently the 
most accepted test of the tax-smoothing hypothesis. 
 
This paper represents progress on previous empirical work for several reasons. 
Firstly this paper adds to the literature by applying two different testing 
procedures to test for the tax-smoothing hypothesis over a single data period 
using a multi country sample. This is done to clarify some previous conflicting 
                                                 
1
 Defined as the public revenue-GDP ratio. 
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results regarding whether the tax smoothing hypothesis holds or not. Secondly a 
dataset, obtained from the European Commission, which measures the temporary 
and permanent components of public expenditure, is applied here in testing for 
support of the tax smoothing hypothesis. This is in response to some of the 
criticisms levelled at Barro’s (1986) estimates of temporary public expenditure 
by Modigliani (1986). The data used to capture temporary public expenditure in 
this paper is the cyclical component of public expenditure obtained from the 
European Commissions AMECO database.  
 
The post 1970 period is an interesting period in which to test for evidence of the 
tax smoothing hypothesis. Tax smoothing suggests a particular pattern of debt 
accumulation in response to the financing of public expenditure shocks. This 
pattern of debt accumulation may be constrained by various institutional features 
in a nation. The post 1970 period encompasses the adoption of the Maastricht 
Criteria and the subsequent Stability and Growth Pact in many of the sample 
countries. These supra-national budgetary institutional changes provide a unique 
opportunity to establish whether this constraint affects the evidence in support of 
the tax smoothing hypothesis in the cross country sample.2 This paper also 
contributes to the literature by explicitly taking into account the effects of the 
Maastricht Treaty and subsequent Stability and Growth Pact on the tax 
smoothing hypothesis. This is achieved by allowing for a structural break in the 
testing procedures applied. Evidence of a structural break is taken as evidence 
                                                 
2
 Considine and Duffy (2006) hae argued that the Maastricht treaty has influenced debt 
accumulation patterns across both EMU and non-EMU countries by institutionalising an 
acceptable level of debt accumulation across countries. 
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that the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent Stability and Growth Pact matters 
for the behaviour of fiscal authorities. The question as to how it affects tax 
smoothing behaviour is also addressed. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows, Section II will outline the fiscal policy 
implications of the tax smoothing hypothesis along with some of the testable 
implications arising from the this hypothesis as well as the findings of previous 
authors. Section III sets out the methodology applied in this paper while Section 
IV provides the results of this study. This paper is completed with some 
conclusions in Section V.  
II. The Fiscal Policy Implications of the Tax Smoothing 
Hypothesis  
 
Taking a Ricardian view of the fiscal deficit Barro’s (1979) paper suggests that 
the optimal level of taxation is one that smoothes tax rates over time in order to 
minimise the distortionary costs of changing tax rates. The distortionary costs of 
taxation arise due to the distortionary costs of taxation on welfare. The marginal 
costs of these distortions are assumed to be an increasing function of the amount 
of resources taxed. Given this assumption Barro shows that the optimal level of 
taxation is one that is constant over time, while satisfying the long run balanced 
budget constraint given the present value of future expected public expenditure. 
It is this constant level of taxation that will minimise the distortionary effects of 
taxation and as such will be the least costly time path for taxation in the long run. 
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Important implications arise out of this theory for the determination of the fiscal 
deficit. Tax smoothing requires that fiscal authorities hold the tax rate constant 
within the constraints of a long run balanced budget. However public expenditure 
shocks caused by events such as wars or recessions occur. The financing of any 
public expenditure shock will be determined by whether the expenditure shock is 
a temporary or permanent expenditure shock. Since the optimal rate of taxation is 
constant given anticipated levels of public expenditure, any positive expenditure 
shock, which is perceived to be temporary in nature, ought to be accompanied by 
a temporary fiscal deficit. Once the temporary expenditure shock has passed, 
public expenditure will revert to its permanent level. At this point the fiscal 
deficit will be eliminated and any accumulated debt will be cleared in the limit 
while the tax rate remains constant throughout.3 This ensures that the government 
budget constraint holds in the limit. A similar analysis can be applied to a 
temporary negative shock to public expenditure which according to the tax 
smoothing hypothesis will result in a temporary fiscal surplus. Correspondingly 
the tax-smoothing hypothesis implies that any permanent positive (negative) 
shock to public expenditure will be financed by a corresponding permanent 
increase (decrease) in taxation. Permanent expenditure shocks will have no effect 
on the fiscal deficit. 4  
 
                                                 
3
 Because the government budget constraint is specified for an infinite horizon, for any temporary 
expenditure shock the change in the tax rate necessary for the budget constraint to hold in the 
limit will be very small. 
4
 For a more detailed explanation of the tax smoothing hypothesis see ROMER (2001, p. 541-
547). 
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The practical implications of the tax smoothing hypothesis are that a positive 
temporary public expenditure shock will result in a temporary fiscal deficit while 
a negative temporary public expenditure shock will result in a temporary fiscal 
surplus. On the other hand a positive permanent shock to public expenditure will 
be financed by an increase in tax rates, while a negative permanent government 
expenditure shock will result in a decrease in tax rates. Several testable 
hypotheses arise out of these practical implications of the tax smoothing 
approach to public finance. Two of these testing procedures are applied in this 
paper. The first of these tests focuses on the determinants of the fiscal deficit 
while the second testing approach focuses on the determinants of the tax rate. 
 
According to the tax smoothing hypothesis the fiscal deficit ought to be 
determined by fluctuations in temporary public expenditure. Hence the first test 
of the tax smoothing hypothesis applied here examines if the fiscal deficit is 
determined by temporary public expenditure. Several papers by Barro (1979, 
1986 and 1987) take this approach to investigating evidence of the tax smoothing 
hypothesis. These papers test the tax smoothing hypothesis by examining the link 
between temporary public expenditure and fiscal deficits for the UK using data 
from 1701-1918 and for the US for the period 1916-1982. All three of Barro’s 
papers have shown support for the tax smoothing hypothesis. 
 
 The choice of data period in both Barro’s US and UK studies is noteworthy. As 
regards the UK study it is important to ask why Barro stops his analysis of the 
UK data in 1918. This may be because the UK did not tax smooth since 1919. 
Indeed Cooley and Ohanian (1997) argue that the poor performance of the UK 
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economy relative to the US since WWII is attributable to the fact that the UK 
moved away from tax smoothing to a policy of active fiscal management 
encouraged by the arguments of Keynes. In the US Barro’s reasons for only 
examining the 20th century data is due to difficulties in obtaining earlier period 
data, however it may also be the case that given that there was so much ‘settling 
in’ of policies and institutions during the 19th century in the US that it is unlikely 
that they followed a tax smoothing policy. This paper extends the methodology 
applied by Barro to a cross country sample of European Union countries in the 
post 1970 period. 
 
A second issue arising out of Barro’s evidence is his construction of the 
temporary components of public expenditure. Modigliani (1986) critically 
evaluates Barro’s (1986) US results by focusing on Barro’s construction of the 
temporary component of public expenditure data series. When examining Barro’s 
data for the two world war periods Modigliani argues that the amount of the 
temporary increase in public expenditure financed through borrowing is much 
lower than the tax smoothing hypothesis would suggest. Modigliani also argues 
that Barro’s measure of permanent public expenditure is sensitive to temporary 
wartime expenditure. If permanent public expenditure is sensitive to temporary 
public expenditure then it becomes impossible to clearly identify tax smoothing 
behaviour.  
 
This study addresses some of the issues raised by Modigliani regarding the data 
used in Barro’s studies. The first point to note about temporary fluctuations in 
public expenditure in the present study is there are no wartime induced 
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fluctuations.5 The post 1970s period has largely been peaceful in the sample 
countries. Barro’s data periods included both wartime expenditure fluctuations 
and cyclical expenditure fluctuations. Barro’s data has the practical implication 
that wartime fluctuations dominate cyclical expenditure fluctuations. This study 
attempts to explain the fiscal deficit in terms of temporary expenditure 
fluctuations that are characterised by cyclical expenditure fluctuations only. The 
methodology used to estimate the cyclical component of public expenditure in 
this study is different from Barro’s. Whereas Barro uses an econometric method6 
to estimate the cyclical components of public expenditure the data used in this 
study estimates the cyclical component of public expenditure by applying the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter to estimate the output gap. The cyclical component of 
public expenditure is then estimated with reference to the output gap by applying 
the elasticity of public expenditure to GDP. The data for the cyclical component 
of public expenditure is obtained from the European Commission. Further details 
on the construction of the cyclical component of public expenditure are provided 
in European Commission, European Economy (2001). 
 
A second method of testing the tax smoothing hypothesis, which is related to 
Barro’s approach, focuses on the tax rate.7 This approach examines the tax 
smoothing hypothesis from the view point that the tax rate ought to be 
determined by permanent public expenditure. Sahasakul (1986) applies this 
                                                 
5
 Over a longer time horizon it could be argued that the post 1970s peacetime period is 
characterised by negative temporary military expenditure.   
6
 See Barro (1986) for an explanation. 
7
 The tax rate is usually defined as public revenue as a share of GDP. Although in the studies by 
Sahasakul (1986) and Gupta (1992) a marginal tax rate is calculated.  
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approach to test the tax smoothing hypothesis using data for the US over the 
period 1937-1982 and Gupta (1992) also uses this approach in testing the tax 
smoothing hypothesis for Canada over the period 1946-1984. Both Gupta (1992) 
and Sahasakul (1986) find that permanent public expenditure is significant in 
determining the tax rate.  
 
A more direct approach to testing the tax smoothing hypothesis through an 
examination of the tax rate is also available. The tax smoothing hypothesis 
maintains that the tax rate ought to be set at time t, based on the current 
information available on present and future spending commitments, such that the 
government intertemporal budget constraint holds in the limit. Hence the tax rate 
at time t can be considered permanent and ought only to be changed in response 
to an unexpected permanent expenditure shock. Any changes in the tax rate 
ought to be unpredictable, given the current information set. As such the tax rate 
at time t ought to be determined by the tax rate in the previous period and a 
random error accounting for any shock that occurs. This data generating process 
is the definition of a unit root process. Therefore evidence of a unit root in the tax 
rate time series can be taken as support for the tax smoothing hypothesis.  
 
Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Strazicich (2002) both apply the unit root testing 
approach to testing the tax smoothing hypothesis in a cross country sample of 
industrialised countries. Using a sample period from 1960-1985 for 15 OECD 
countries, Roubini and Sachs (1989) find that the hypothesis of a driftless 
random walk in tax rates is rejected in 12 out of the 15 countries tested. This is 
taken as evidence against the tax smoothing hypothesis as the drift term in the tax 
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rate is evidence of an upward drifting tax rate in line with increasing public 
expenditure. However a drift term may still be present in the tax rate time series 
even if a tax smoothing policy is being followed. The upward drift in public 
expenditure during the Roubini and Sachs (1989) study is likely to have been 
unexpected by policy makers. If this upward drift in expenditure is seen as a 
permanent peacetime public expenditure increase, then an upward drift in the tax 
rate during the period will be consistent with tax smoothing. Also if the marginal 
cost function of the tax rate was decreasing over time then tax smoothing would 
be consistent with the finding of an upward drift in the tax rate. Strazicich (2002) 
also tests for the presence of a unit root in the tax rate data using central 
government revenue while allowing for the presence of a drift term. A group of 
19 industrial countries are examined over the period 1955-1988. Both single 
equation and panel unit root tests are applied and neither of these tests can reject 
the null hypothesis of a unit root in 18 out of the 19 countries examined. 
 
A fundamental implication of the tax-smoothing hypothesis is that no other 
variables besides permanent public expenditure should be capable of determining 
the tax rate. Similarly evidence that factors besides temporary public expenditure 
determine the fiscal deficit is accepted as evidence against the tax smoothing 
hypothesis. In an important contribution to the political economy of fiscal policy, 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) argue that tax smoothing cannot explain the public 
debt accumulation patterns in Europe over the 1970s and 1980s and instead they 
resort to political economy explanations. In this paper they emphasise the role of 
electoral systems, party structure, government fragmentation and political 
polarisation in determining the fiscal deficit. In a later paper, Alesina and Perotti 
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(1999) place more emphasis on the role of fiscal institutions in explaining the 
fiscal deficit. Indeed policy makers have also recognised the importance of fiscal 
institutions in constraining the accumulation of public debt. The policy 
implications of this work are expressed in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget-
balance amendment and the excess deficit procedure in the European Union’s 
Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent Stability and Growth Pact. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty agreed in December 1991 required that EU countries 
seeking entry to the second stage of European Monetary Union (EMU) must 
achieve a 60% of GDP debt target or be making a significant effort to reach this 
target by May 1998. The Treaty also requires a fiscal deficit of below 3% of 
GDP. The imposition of this constraint on the actions of fiscal policy makers has 
had impact on fiscal policy in both EMU countries and beyond. Considine and 
Duffy (2006) have argued that the Maastricht Treaty has institutionalised the 
60% debt target as a generally acceptable level of debt across countries. This has 
resulted in a change to cross country debt accumulation patterns. This change has 
resulted in a move away from explosive patterns of debt accumulation in several 
EU countries towards a more sustainable fiscal policy. This change in debt 
accumulation patterns is more consistent with tax smoothing. As such the UK, 
Denmark, Sweden, USA and Japan are included in the analysis here even though 
they are not bound by the Stability and Growth Pact. Ballabriga and Martinez-
Mongay (2005) have also recognised the role of Maastricht in inducing a move 
towards sustainable policy in some EU countries. This present study recognises 
the imposition the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent Stability and Growth Pact 
on the evidence in support of the tax smoothing hypothesis in EU countries.  
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III. Testing the Tax Smoothing Hypothesis  
 
This paper applies two testing procedures to test for evidence of the tax 
smoothing hypothesis. In both testing procedures a structural break is included to 
allow for the effects of the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent Stability and 
Growth Pact on the behaviour of fiscal authorities in the post 1991 period. The 
first testing procedure focuses on the relationship between the fiscal deficit and 
the cyclical component of public expenditure. This test involves applying a 
model similar to that set out in Barro (1979, 1986 and 1987). This model is set up 
in equation 1 as follows 
1  (bt-bt-1) = α0 + α1(bt-1) + α2 g~ t + ∑
=
k
i 1
1-i-ti-ti3 )b-(bα + ut 
 
Where bt is general government gross debt at the end of year t expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. bt-bt-1 is the stock flow consistent fiscal deficit expressed as 
a percentage of GDP for year t, g~ t is the cyclical component of public 
expenditure expressed as a percentage of GDP, α0 is an intercept term and ut is a 
white noise error term. The ∑
=
k
i 1
1-i-ti-ti3 )b-(bα  term represents lagged values of 
the stock flow consistent fiscal deficit which is included to remove any serial 
autocorrelation. Acceptance of the tax smoothing hypothesis requires that the 
estimated coefficient on the cyclical component of public expenditure is unity or 
close to unity.  
 
To establish whether the effects of the Maastricht Treaty influenced the 
relationship between the cyclical component of public expenditure and the fiscal 
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deficit two dummy variables are added to the model as shown in equation 2 
below. 
2 (bt-bt-1) = α0 + d1 + α1(bt-1) + α2 g~ t + d2 g~ t + ∑
=
k
i 1
1-i-ti-ti3 )b-(bα + ut 
The first dummy variable d1 allows for the Maastricht Treaty to cause a shift in 
the intercept term while the second dummy variable d2 allows for the Maastricht 
Treaty to cause a shift in the slope coefficient on the cyclical component of 
public expenditure term. Both dummy variables take on a value of 0 in the period 
1970 to the structural break, and a value of 1 otherwise. Failure to reject the joint 
hypothesis that these two dummy variables are equal to zero will be taken as 
evidence of a structural break in the model. A structural break can be taken as 
evidence that the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent Stability and Growth Pact 
were significant in altering the behaviour of fiscal authorities by altering the 
relationship between the fiscal deficit and the cyclical component of public 
expenditure. Allowing for a structural break, support for the tax smoothing 
hypothesis now requires that α2= 1 in the pre structural break period and that α2 
+ d2 = 1 in the post structural break period. Dummy variables are applied 
recursively from 1991 to 1994 to establish if the Maastricht Treaty changes the 
relationship between temporary public expenditure and the fiscal deficit. 
 
The second set of testing procedures applied in this paper focuses on the 
implications of the tax smoothing hypothesis for the tax rate. Three different 
testing procedures are applied to test whether the tax rate follows a unit root 
process. Three tests for a unit root are applied in this paper due to the importance 
of the accuracy of these tests for the hypothesis under investigation. The first of 
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these unit root tests is the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. The second test 
applied is the Phillips-Perron (PP) (1988) test. This test is included as it allows 
for an error term that is not identically and independently distributed by adding a 
correction factor to the Dickey Fuller test statistic. A weakness of both the ADF 
and the PP tests is the fact that the null hypothesis is that the time series contains 
a unit root. Due to the dominant role of the null hypothesis in classical testing 
techniques an alternative is to set up a testing procedure with the null hypothesis 
as that of stationarity. One such test is the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and 
Shin (KPSS) (1992) test which is also applied in this paper. The application of 
these three testing procedures will further the robustness of any finding of a unit 
root in the tax rate data series and thus further the robustness of any evidence 
provided in support of the tax smoothing hypothesis. The first difference of the 
tax rate data series is also tested for the presence of a unit root to ensure there are 
no further roots in the data. 
 
An oft cited criticism of unit root testing procedures is that a structural break in 
either the intercept or the trend in a stationary series can look like a unit root 
process if the structural break is not taken into account in the testing procedure. 
If the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent Stability and Growth Pact cause such a 
structural break in the tax rate time series, then the unit root testing procedures 
may be incorrectly indicating the presence of a unit root. To take account of the 
potential of this problem the Perron (1989) test incorporates the effects of a 
single structural break in the standard ADF unit root testing procedure. The 
Perron (1989) approach allows for three extensions of the standard ADF tests. 
These three extensions allow for a structural break in the ADF test while each 
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nests the alternative hypothesis of a trend stationary process with a structural 
break. These three models are outlined below. 
 
Model A:  
This model tests the null hypothesis of a unit root process with trend in the 
presence of a change in level against the alternative hypothesis of a trend 
stationary process in the presence of a change in intercept. 
 ∆Yt =α0 + λ Yt-1 + β t + δ1DVUt + δ2DVTBt + ∑
=
k
i 1
αi ∆Yt-i + εt 
Where  
t = time trend , TB = time of structural break 
DVUt = 0 if t≤TB and DVUt = 1 if t> TB  
DVTB = 1 if t=TB+1 and DVTB = 0 otherwise 
 
Model B:  
This model tests the null hypothesis of a unit root process with trend in the 
presence of a change in growth rate against the alternative hypothesis of a trend 
stationary process in the presence of a change of slope. 
 ∆Yt =α0 + λ Yt-1+ βt + δ1DVUt + δ3DVT*t + ∑
=
k
i 1
αi ∆Yt-i + εt 
Where  
DVT*t = 0 if t≤TB and DVT*t= t - TB if t>TB 
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Model C:  
This model tests the null hypothesis of a unit root process with trend in the 
presence of a change in level and a change in growth rate against the alternative 
hypothesis of a trend stationary process in the presence of a change in intercept 
and slope. 
 ∆Yt =α0 + λ Yt-1+ βt + δ1DVUt + δ2DVTBt + δ4DVTt + ∑
=
k
i 1
αi ∆Yt-i + εt 
Where 
DVTt = 0 if t≤ TB and DVTt = t if t> TB 
 
The parameter of interest in each of these models is the λ term. This term is used 
to test whether the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected when allowance 
is made for a structural break. The critical values for this t test are tabulated by 
Perron (1989).8 
 
The data to be used in this study covers 12 European Union countries over the 
period from approximately 1970-2005 (the start date varies slightly for some 
countries due to data constraints). The countries examined include Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK. Other EU countries have been omitted due to 
limitations in obtaining all of the necessary data. The remaining countries were 
selected due to the availability of the cyclical component of public expenditure 
                                                 
8
 The Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root test in the presence of a structural break, which allows 
the data to select the time of the structural break, is often preferred to the Perron (1989) test. In 
this study the structural break is imposed to test for the effects of the Maastricht Treaty and is 
thus constrained to the early 1990s period using the Perron (1989) test. 
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which was obtained from the European Commission. All public finance data is 
obtained at the general government level. The following section gives the results 
of the tests applied. 
IV. Empirical Results  
 
This section presents the results of the testing procedures outlined in the previous 
section. Both the Barro regression and unit root testing procedures are applied to 
assess whether the sample countries were tax smoothing in the post 1970 period. 
A structural break is allowed for in the testing procedures in the post 1991 period 
to allow for the effects of the constraints imposed in the Maastricht Treaty and 
the subsequent Stability and Growth Pact. The application of these two tests to 
the same sample of countries over identical time periods will help to elucidate on 
the tax smoothing hypothesis clearing up some of the inconsistencies found by 
previous studies that used different data periods and different testing 
methodologies over different sample countries. Allowing for a structural break 
will help to establish if the Maastricht Treaty has had an effect on the behaviour 
of fiscal authorities in the sample countries. 
 
The first test to be applied extends Barro’s (1987) model given in equation 5.1 to 
a multi country setting. The model is applied to each country individually for the 
period 1971-2005 in most cases.9 Additional lags of the independent variable are 
                                                 
9
 The start data is later in some countries due to the unavailability of data. The start data in 
Austria is 1976 due to a limitation in obtaining data on the temporary component of public 
expenditure. In Denmark, France, Netherlands and Portugal the start date is 1971, 1977, 1974 and 
1973 respectively due to a limitation in obtaining public debt data. 
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included to remove any serial autocorrelation. The Akaike Information Criterion 
and the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion are used to select the 
appropriate lag length. The appropriate lag length is denoted as k. The regression 
has been estimated using heteroscedastic robust methods. The results of this 
regression are given in Table 1 on the following page. 
Table 1: Results of the Barro regression without a structural break. 
Country k α0 α1 α2 α2=12 2R  
Austria 0 5.611* 
(7.461) 
-0.082*        
(-4.759) 
11.227*  
(4.344) 
15.659* 0.343 
Belgium 1 4.254*  
(2.935) 
-0.040*       
(-2.589) 
5.903 
(1.056) 
0.770 0.643 
 Denmark 1 3.159*  
(2.050) 
-0.061*        
(-2.165) 
8.354*  
(3.096) 
7.429* 0.617 
Finland 2 2.609*  
(3.156) 
-0.064*       
(-2.946) 
6.380*   
(3.732) 
9.905* 0.695 
France 4 2.086*  
(2.392) 
0.002 
(0.114) 
8.578   
(1.802) 
2.533 0.318 
Germany 0 1.620* 
(2.245) 
-0.003     (-
0.205) 
4.910  
(1.745) 
1.931 0.058 
Ireland 1 3.067  
(1.272) 
-0.021       
(-0.790) 
4.998 
(1.354) 
1.173 0.377 
Netherlands 3 9.398*    
(4.877) 
-0.122*        
(-4.396) 
2.093 
(1.982) 
1.072 0.714 
Portugal 0 6.131 * 
(2.982) 
-0.098 *        
(-2.354) 
14.413*  
(2.110) 
3.857* 0.180 
Spain 1 2.207*  
(3.656) 
-0.044 *        
(-2.956) 
12.642*    
(2.280) 
4.408* 0.432 
Sweden 0 6.704*  
(3.820) 
-0.127 *        
(-3.973) 
14.253*   
(6.906) 
41.234* 0.634 
UK 1 4.959*  
(2.969) 
-0.101*        
(-3.036) 
3.901 
(1.774) 
1.740 0.555 
1) Regression equation given by (bt-bt-1) = α0 + α1(bt-1) + α2 g~ t  + ∑
=
k
i 1
1-i-ti-t3i )b-(bα  + ut 
2) t-statistics on tests of the significance of the coefficients are given in parenthesis.  
3) The χ2(1) test tests the tax smoothing hypothesis that the α2=1. 
4) * denotes significance at the 5% significance level. The 5% critical value for the χ2 (1) is 3.841 
and t30 critical value is 2.042. 
 
 
Table 1 presents the results of tests of the tax smoothing hypothesis based upon 
the Barro regression over the period 1970-2005. No allowance is made here for 
the possible effects of the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent Stability and 
Growth Pact. The explanatory power of the regression is quite low in some 
countries, particularly in Germany and Portugal, indicating that the regression 
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does not offer a good explanation of the fiscal deficit. The 2R  is above 0.6 in 
only five of the twelve countries. The parameter of interest with regards to the 
tax smoothing hypothesis is the α2 term, the coefficient on the cyclical 
component of public expenditure. Support for the tax smoothing hypothesis 
requires that this term is equal to or close to unity. A χ2 (1) test is used to test the 
hypothesis that this coefficient is equal to unity. The tax smoothing hypothesis 
cannot be rejected in half the sample countries, including Belgium, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands and the UK. 
 
In all of the countries where the tax smoothing hypothesis is rejected the 
coefficient on the α2 term is actually greater than unity. This may be caused by 
several factors. Firstly, any value greater than one on the cyclical component of 
public expenditure may indicate a tendency to lower taxes during a recession, 
possibly as the result of counter cyclical fiscal policies. Secondly, the coefficient 
may be greater than unity because cyclical fluctuations in the temporary public 
expenditure term tend to coincide with contrary temporary shocks to tax 
revenues. A final reason for the high value on the coefficient on the cyclical 
component of public expenditure term may be due to a weakness in the 
construction of the temporary spending variable or to a weakness in the 
specification in the regression equation. 
 
One possible weakness in the specification of the regression equation is that it 
does not allow for the possibility of a structural break in the tax smoothing 
relation which may have occurred due to the imposition of the constraint of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent Stability and Growth Pact. This constraint 
may result in fiscal authorities moving away from a policy of tax smoothing to 
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more active fiscal policy management. To allow for this possibility two dummy 
variables are included in equation 1. These dummy variables allow for structural 
change in the intercept term and in the slope coefficient on the cyclical 
component of public expenditure term. The results of this regression are given in 
Table 2 on the following page. The regression is estimated using heteroscedastic 
robust methods along with k lags of the dependent variable to remove any serial 
autocorrelation.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Results of the Barro regression with a structural break.  
 
1) Regression equation given by (bt-bt-1) = α0 + d1 + α1(bt-1) + α2 g~ t + d2 g~ t + ∑
=
k
i 1
1-i-ti-t3i )b-(bα  + ut 
2) Both d1 and d2 are =0 if t<= structural break and 1 otherwise. 
3) t-statistics are given in parenthesis. The t30 critical value is 2.042.  χ2 (1) is used to test the tax smoothing hypothesis that α2=1 and also that α2+ d2 =1.  χ2 (2)   
is used to test the hypothesis that d1= d2 =0.The 5% critical value is 3.841 for χ2 (1) and 5.99 for χ2 (2). * denotes significance at the 5% significance level.
Country Structural 
Break 
k α0 d1 α1 α2 d2 d1= d2 =0 α2=1 
 
α2+ d2 =1 2R  
Austria 1991 0 8.024*     
(6.850 ) 
2.300*     
(2.487 ) 
-0.151*     
(-5.512) 
19.671*     
(4.334 ) 
-2.938     
(-0.388 ) 
9.218* 16.923* 5.284* 0.370 
Belgium 1994 1 3.873*  
(2.727) 
-3.235*  
(-2.323) 
-0.022   
(-1.189) 
9.712 
(1.664) 
-11.828   
(-0.860) 
6.663* 2.228 0.060 0.678 
Denmark 1994 1 3.588*     
(2.159) 
-3.695*     
(-2.907) 
-0.046    
(-1.651) 
10.891*     
(3.482) 
-12.337*    
(-2.925) 
13.283* 10.002* 0.673 0.718 
Finland 1991 2 3.2741*    
(7.206) 
5.453*    
(4.592) 
-0.199*     
(-6.388) 
3.176*    
(4.632) 
11.763*     
(5.150) 
154.260* 10.074* 29.004* 0.912 
France 1991 4 6.192*    
(8.905) 
3.901*   
(6.931) 
-0.107*    
(-5.433) 
4.114*    
(2.366) 
27.174*    
(6.647) 
64.871* 3.208 42.649* 0.787 
 
Germany 1991 0 4.370*   
(3.428) 
3.711*    
(2.784) 
-0.108*    
(-2.629) 
9.387   
(1.796) 
0.314   
(0.058 ) 
10.238* 2.575 6.981* 0.260 
Ireland 1992 1 5.323   
(1.841) 
-6.263 
(-1.486) 
-0.043    
(-1.401) 
2.215 
(0.664) 
-3.601     
(-0.444) 
6.167* 0.133 0.081 0.401 
Netherlands 1993 3 13.051*    
(7.093) 
-2.561 
(-1.648) 
-0.090*  
(-3.972) 
5.435*    
(5.846) 
2.905 
(1.883) 
37.746* 22.758* 18.509* 0.829 
Portugal 1991 0 6.323*    
(3.182) 
0.277 
(0.225) 
-0.105*     
(-2.351) 
16.843   
(1.565) 
-4.720     
(-0.346) 
0.184 2.166 2.063 0.123 
Spain 1994 1 0.070 
(0.894) 
-5.087*  
(-2.767) 
0.053 
(1.247) 
21.409*  
(4.726) 
4.122 
(0.469) 
9.831* 20.296* 11.140* 0.501 
Sweden 1992 0 5.802*    
(3.678) 
-2.281 
(-2.014) 
-0.097*         
(-3.111) 
12.459*    
(5.981) 
7.915  
(1.886) 
6.294* 30.262* 27.824* 0.675 
UK 1991 1 1.805  
(0.697) 
4.503*    
(3.589) 
-0.052    
(-1.169) 
4.688   
(1.90) 
36.335*     
(5.821) 
33.899* 2.234 34.619* 0.617 
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Table 2 presents the results of the Barro regression tests of the tax smoothing 
hypothesis over the sample period, allowing for a structural break due to the 
Maastricht Treaty. Allowance for a structural break is made by including an 
intercept dummy variable (d1) and a slope dummy variable (d2) on the cyclical 
component of public expenditure term in the regression. Both dummy variables 
take on a value of zero from 1970 to the structural break, and a value of one 
thereafter. A structural break is first tested for in 1991. For the countries in which 
this is found not to be significant the structural break is recursively rolled 
forward until 1995. For countries in which a structural break is not significant the 
results are shown for the insignificant structural break in 1991.  
 
The allowance for a structural break has improved the explanatory power of the 
regression in almost all countries. The 2R  is now greater than 0.6 in seven of the 
twelve countries. To test whether the structural break is statistically significant a 
χ2 (2) test is applied to test the null hypothesis that the intercept and the slope 
dummy variables are jointly equal to zero. A structural break, occurring between 
1991 and 1994, is found to be statistically significant at the 5% level in almost all 
countries, with the exception Portugal. This indicates that a structural break 
occurs in nearly all countries in the relationship between the fiscal deficit and the 
cyclical component of public expenditure. The timing of the structural break 
coincides with the imposition of the fiscal constraints of the Maastricht Treaty. 
The question remains as to how the change in behaviour affects evidence of tax 
smoothing behaviour.  
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The parameters of interest with regards to the tax smoothing hypothesis are the 
α2 coefficient on the cyclical component of public expenditure term and the d2 
slope dummy variable on the cyclical component of public expenditure. When 
allowance is made for a structural break, support for the tax smoothing 
hypothesis now requires that α2= 1 in the pre structural break period and that α2 
+ d2 = 1 in the post structural break period. The results in Table 2 above show 
that the hypothesis that α2 = 1 cannot be rejected in half of the sample countries 
including Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and the UK. This is 
evidence that the tax smoothing hypothesis is supported in these countries prior 
to the effects of the Maastricht Treaty. The results in Table 2 also show that the 
hypothesis that α2 + d2 = 1 cannot be rejected in only four of the twelve countries 
including Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Portugal, showing less support for the 
tax smoothing hypothesis in the post Maastricht period. 
 
The evidence presented thus far indicates that the Maastricht Treaty does indeed 
result in a structural break in the relationship between the temporary component 
of public expenditure and the fiscal deficit. In tests of the tax smoothing 
hypothesis, taking account of the structural break reduces the number of 
countries which show support for the tax smoothing hypothesis. France, 
Germany and the UK no longer show support for the tax smoothing hypothesis 
after the Maastricht Treaty where as they did show support for the tax smoothing 
hypothesis prior to the Treaty. The evidence in Portugal suggests that the 
Maastricht Treaty resulted in a movement towards tax smoothing behaviour. 
Although this evidence is weakened by the observation that Portugal is the only 
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country in which a structural break is not significant. When the structural break is 
excluded Portugal shows no evidence in support of the tax smoothing hypothesis. 
 
Overall the results from the Barro regressions show that the Maastricht Treaty 
matters. The Maastricht Treaty results in some movement away from tax 
smoothing behaviour. Only six of the twelve countries show support for the tax 
smoothing hypothesis prior to the Maastricht Treaty, after the Maastricht Treaty 
support for the tax smoothing hypothesis is provided in only three countries. 
Taking both periods together the post 1970 cross country sample indicates that 
whereas there is some evidence of tax smoothing behaviour there are significant 
departures. Those departures are much more prevalent in the post Maastricht 
period. 
 
One of those reasons given for the high value that is observed on the cyclical 
component of public expenditure coefficient is that it may be as a result of a 
weakness in the construction of the cyclical component of public expenditure 
term. A more direct means to test the tax-smoothing hypothesis which is not 
affected by the accuracy of the measure the cyclical component of public 
expenditure is to test if the tax rate time series contains a unit root. To test for a 
unit root the augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Phillips Perron (PP) and 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) unit root testing procedures 
have been applied. These three testing procedures are applied together to further 
the robustness of any findings. To take account of any possible structural break 
in the time series the Perron (1989) unit root testing method is also applied. This 
approach takes account of the effects of a structural break in the unit root tests in 
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the ADF equations. The results of the ADF, PP and KPSS unit root tests without 
taking account of a possible structural break are given in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Unit root test results on the tax rate time series using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test, 
the Phillips Perron test and the KPSS test for the period 1970-2005. 
Augmented Dickey Fuller tests 
Country Model with constant Model with constant 
and time trend 
Model with first 
differences 
Austria -2.993* -0.885 -3.540* 
Belgium -2.448 -2.176 -5.780* 
Denmark -1.450 -1.528 -4.165* 
Finland -2.354 -1.509 -4.765* 
France -1.898 -1.266 -4.707* 
Germany -3.550* -2.766 -5.448* 
Ireland -1.709 -1.251 -6.282* 
Netherlands -2.374 -2.576 -4.725* 
Portugal -0.670 -3.521* -6.471* 
Spain -1.963 -0.411 -4.791* 
Sweden -2.727 -1.707 -2.720 
UK -2.967* -3.483 -2.967* 
Phillips Perron test (l=3 in all cases) 
Country Model with constant Model with constant 
and time trend 
Model with first 
differences 
Austria -3.125* -0.713 -4.795* 
Belgium -2.549 -2.280 -5.969* 
Denmark -1.483 -1.853 -6.543* 
Finland -2.506 -1.512 -4.857* 
France -1.892 -1.416 -4.919* 
Germany -3.611* -2.896 -5.617* 
Ireland -1.785 -1.287 -6.440* 
Netherlands -2.429 -2.771 -4.871* 
Portugal -0.598 -3.582* -5.674* 
Spain -1.828 -0.637 -5.050* 
Sweden -2.870 -1.732 -4.918* 
UK -2.653 -2.692 -4.336* 
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Table 3 Continued. 
KPSS test (l= 3 in all cases) 
Country Model with constant Model with constant 
and time trend 
Model with first 
differences 
Austria 0.676* 0.239* 0.639* 
Belgium 0.764* 0.148* 0.250 
Denmark 0.865* 0.195* 0.149 
Finland 0.839* 0.203* 0.334 
France 0.836* 0.211* 0.249 
Germany 0.291 0.103 0.339 
Ireland 0.368 0.230* 0.279 
Netherlands 0.233 0.230* 0.459 
Portugal 0.987* 0.115 0.088 
Spain 0.877* 0.232* 0.367 
Sweden 0.678* 0.231* 0.411 
UK 0.478* 0.088 0.098 
1) The lag length for the ADF tests is selected using the LM and the BIC.  
2) The lag truncation parameter in the PP and KPSS tests is set at l = T1/3 as recommended by 
Andrews (1991, cited in Patterson 2000).  
3) * denotes significance at the 5% level. The 5% critical values for the test statistics are as 
follows: The ADF with constant is 2.93, with constant and time trend is 3.50, and in first 
differences is 2.93. The Phillips Perron with constant is 2.945, with constant and time trend is 
3.539 and in first differences is 2.947. The KPSS with constant is 0.463, with constant and time 
trend is 0.146 and in first differences is 0.463. 
 
The results of the ADF and PP unit root tests in Table 3 indicate that the null 
hypothesis of a unit root in the tax rate time series cannot be rejected in most 
cases when a time trend is either included or excluded. This lends strong support 
to the tax smoothing hypothesis. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in 
Austria and Germany when a time trend is excluded and in Portugal when a time 
trend is included. Additionally the ADF test also rejects the null hypothesis of a 
unit root in the UK. 
 
Due to the effects of the dominant role of the null hypothesis in testing 
procedures the KPSS unit root test is also applied. This test is set up such that the 
null hypothesis is that of stationarity. The results of this test, also given in Table 
3 above, are again supportive of the tax smoothing hypothesis in most countries. 
In Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands there is, however, no evidence of a unit 
root when a time trend is excluded. Additionally there is also no evidence of a 
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unit root in Germany, Portugal, and the UK when a time trend is included. The 
first differences of the data series are found to be stationary across the three 
testing procedures in most cases, with the exception of Sweden under the ADF 
test and in Austria according to the KPSS test. This shows little evidence of more 
than one root in the tax rate data series. Overall the unit root testing procedures 
are generally supportive of the tax smoothing hypothesis in most countries.  
 
One limitation of the above unit root tests is that they are biased towards 
identifying a unit root if the series is stationary with a structural break. The 
structural break may result in the non rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit 
root when the alternative is true for any of the following three reasons. Firstly, 
the series may be trend stationary with a one time change in the level. Secondly, 
the series may be trend stationary with a change in the trend slope (growth rate). 
Thirdly the series may be trend stationary with a change in both the level and the 
trend slope. If any of these three scenarios capture the true data generating 
process then the unit root process is biased towards the non rejection of a unit 
root. Perron (1989) suggests three models as outlined earlier to allow for the 
above three scenarios. Table 4 below presents the results of these tests for a unit 
root in each of the three models allowing for a structural break. The Perron 
(1989) test was conducted for all countries allowing for a structural break in each 
of the years 1991-1994 inclusive. Table 4 on the following page shows a 
selection of these results.  
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Table 4: Perron unit root tests allowing for a structural break in the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
regressions. 
  Model A Model B Model C 
Country Structural 
Break 
k Unit root test 
statistic 
k Unit root test 
statistic 
k Unit root test 
statistic 
Austria 1991 0 -0.887   0 -1.652  0 -1.321 
Belgium 1991 0 -1.447   0 -1.381 0 -1.445 
Denmark 1991 0 -1.646 0 -2.856 0 -2.482  
Finland 1991 0 -1.804   0 -2.945  0 -2.876  
France 1991 0 -1.051   1 -1.316  0 -1.125  
Germany 1991 0 -2.718 0 -3.184  0 -2.927 
Ireland 1991 0 -1.950 0 -2.803 0 -2.690  
Netherlands 1992 0 -4.080* 0 -1.875  0 -2.403 
Portugal 1991 1 -5.030*  1 -6.712* 1 -6.250*  
Spain 1993 1 -3.456  1 -3.937* 0 -5.243*  
Sweden 1991 0 -1.356  0 -2.171  0 -2.367 
UK 1991 1 -4.141* 1 -4.716* 1 -4.539*  
1) Perron (1989) test for a unit root is given for each of the three models A, B & C. 
2) The appropriate lag length is chosen for the autoregressive process by adding lags until the LM 
statistic fails to reject no serial autocorrelation.  
3) The 5% critical values for the test statistic as tabulated by Perron (1989). The critical values 
when the structural break is in 1991 in model A is 3.76, the critical value in model B is 3.95 and 
the critical value in model C is 4.24. The critical values when the structural break is later than 
1991 in Model A is 3.80, in Model B 3.85 and in Model C is 4.18. 
 
Table 4 gives the results of the three unit root tests as outlined by Perron (1989) 
for the test of the null hypothesis that the tax rate time series contains a unit root 
when allowance is made for a structural break. The parameter of interest in 
testing the null hypothesis of a unit root is the t test statistic on the Yt-1 term. A 
structural break is applied recursively between the years 1991-1994 to establish 
if it affects the results of the null hypothesis that the tax rate time series contains 
a unit root. The results in Table 4 show that the null hypothesis of a unit root, 
when allowance is made for a structural break, cannot be rejected in nine out of 
the 12 countries across all three of the Perron (1989) models. This includes 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France Germany, Ireland, Italy, and 
Sweden. Table 4 gives the Perron (1989) test statistic for these countries 
allowing for a structural break in 1991. This result holds when a structural break 
is allowed in each of the years 1991-1994. In the remaining three countries, 
either one or more of the Perron (1989) models reject the null hypothesis of a 
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unit root when a structural break is allowed at some point between 1991 and 
1994. The results in Table 4 show that the null hypothesis of a unit root is 
rejected in the UK and Portugal when a structural break is allowed in 1991 across 
all three models. The null hypothesis of a unit root is also rejected in the 
Netherlands when a structural break is allowed in 1992 in model A, in Spain in 
1993 when a structural break is allowed in 1993 in model B.  
 
Comparing the results from Table 4 above with those from the augmented 
Dickey Fuller tests given in Table 3 allows for an assessment to be made 
regarding the effects of the Maastricht Treaty on the evidence in support of the 
tax smoothing hypothesis. The Augmented Dickey Duller test results provide a 
consistent comparison as the Perron (1989) tests amount to the inclusion of a 
structural break in the Augmented Dickey and Fuller tests. The null hypothesis of 
a unit root is rejected in four countries, including the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain ant the UK when a structural break is included in the test. The null 
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in only four countries, including Austria, 
Germany, Portugal and the UK, when a structural break is not included. In the 
countries where the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected, only two countries 
consistently reject the hypothesis both with and without the inclusion of a 
structural break. The question as to whether the Maastricht Treaty affects the 
support for the tax smoothing hypothesis is, according to the unit root tests is not 
convincing. 
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V. Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there is evidence of tax 
smoothing in 12 European Union countries in the post 1970 period. Previous 
studies have found conflicting evidence as to whether there is evidence of tax 
smoothing over a range of different countries, over different sample periods, 
using a number of different testing methodologies. This present paper applies 
two different testing methodologies over a single sample of European Union 
countries to establish the evidence in support of the tax smoothing hypothesis. 
The first testing method applies a regression equation similar to that put forward 
by Barro (1979, 1986 and 1987). The second testing method involves applying 
three unit root testing procedures to establish if the tax rate time series contains a 
unit root and thus provides evidence of tax smoothing behaviour. 
 
The agreement of the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent Stability and Growth 
Pact in most of the sample countries constitutes the imposition of a supra-
national budgetary constraint. This constraint influences fiscal policy and has 
implications for evidence of tax smoothing behaviour. Therefore the tests applied 
in this study allow for a structural break to take account of this constraint. A 
finding that a structural break occurs provides support for the hypothesis that the 
constraint matters. The effects of the constraint on tax smoothing behaviour are 
also analysed. 
 
Overall the evidence presented reflects that some of the results obtained are 
sensitive to the testing method employed. Over the full period, without taking 
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account for a structural break, the null hypothesis that countries are tax 
smoothing cannot be rejected in about half of the countries. This shows that 
while there is some evidence of support for the tax smoothing hypothesis, there 
are significant deviations from this policy. One possible explanation for these 
departures investigated here is due to budgetary institutions. The evidence 
suggests that the Maastricht Treaty resulted in a structural break in the behaviour 
of fiscal authorities in all countries except Portugal. There is also evidence that 
the Maastricht Treaty resulted in a movement away from tax smoothing policies 
in some countries. Although this evidence of the effects of the Maastricht Treaty 
on tax smoothing behaviour is again sensitive to the testing procedure applied.  
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